T he use of coercion to impose mental health treatment has been legally and morally debated for centuries. The discourse has moved from the use of involuntary hospitalization, to forced medication and the right to refuse treatment, to the current focus on the use of coercion in the community (Dennis & Monahan, 1996) . Proponents of legally mandated mental health treatment argue that because of their illness, many individuals with mental disorders are unable to make rational decisions about treatment (Torrey & Zdanowicz, 2001) . Research indicates that many people who are hospitalized lack decisional competence in at least one area related to treatment (Grisso & Appelbaum, 1995) . Thus, legal leverage may be necessary for some to receive the benefits of treatment. Opponents question the therapeutic effectiveness of legally mandated treatment and rightfully argue that research supporting its use in many forms is lacking. They also argue that mandating treatment may discourage people from seeking voluntary services out of fear that they will be committed and held indefinitely (Allen & Smith, 2001) .
Many ideological and empirical questions about mandated treatment remain (Draine, 1997) , but its use is expanding (Halpern & Szmuckler, 1997) . For example, in considering the reauthorization of the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, the U.S. Senate included a proposed amendment requiring states to use outpatient commitment in response to homelessness among people with mental illness (Draine) . This type of policy tends to be applied disproportionately to populations marginalized by race and poverty. Policies supporting mandated treatment are made by legislators and judges, often based on perceptions of public concern (Pescosolido, Monahan, Link, Stueve, & Kikuzawa, 1999) .Thus, it is important to understand the process by which members of the public judge the appropriateness of legal means to coerce individuals into a range of mental health treatments.
Several recent studies have examined public views of legally mandated treatment and found that when respondents perceived that a hypothetical individual was dangerous, they were more likely to endorse forced treatment for that individual (Corrigan, Markowitz, Watson, Rowan, & Kubiak, 2003; Pescosolido et al., 1999) . These studies also suggested that perceived competence to make treatment decisions (Pescosohdo et al., 1999) , attributions about the cause of the condition, and affective reactions play a significant role. Consistent with this earlier research, we believe that both attributional processes and concerns about dangerousness motivate support for legal coercion, particularly when mandated treatment is viewed more as a method of social control than a means to deliver help. Building on earlier work, we examined the relative impact of attributions about the cause of mental illness and perceptions of dangerousness in determining public support for legally mandated treatment, and bow political ideology sbapes tbis process.
ATTRIBUTIONAL MODEL OF PUBLIC SUPPORT
According to social psychologist Bernard Weiner (1995) , wben people encounter unusual circumstances (sucb as mental illness), they seek to identify causal processes as a way of making sense of tbe pbenomenon. In doing so, tbey make attributions about cause and controllability. If tbe cause of an event is attributed to forces witbin an individual s control, tbat individual is judged personally responsible. For example, if mental illness is attributed to bad cbaracter (tbat is, people act depressed because tbey are lazy or immoral), tbe individual is judged responsible for tbe illness. If tbe cause is attributed to forces outside individual control, tbe individuals are not judged responsible. For example, people suffering from mental illnesses tbat are perceived by tbe public as being caused by a genetic abnormality or a traumatic brain injury would not be judged responsible.Tbus, judgments of responsibility require buman agency or cboice.
To explain tbe link between tbougbt and action, Scbmidt and Weiner, 1988 , posited tbat emotion (anger or sympatby) mediates cognition (attribution and judgment of responsibility) and action (belping or punisbing bebavior). If a member of tbe general public perceives tbat tbe cause of an individual's mental illness is controllable, tbat member of tbe pubbc considers tbe person responsible for tbe condition, reacts angrily, and bebaves in a punisbing or neglectful manner toward tbe individual. Anger is generated by tbe belief tbat anotber person was able to bebave differently or able to avoid a situation. It directs tbe individual to react in a punisbing or self-protective manner (Weiner, 1995) . Conversely, if tbe cause is perceived as not controllable, tbe person is judged not responsible, sympatby is experienced, and belping bebavior is elicited. In our study we predicted tbat respondents wbo attribute responsibility for tbe iUness to tbe individual (for example, as a result of bad cbaracter) would experience anger and be more likely to endorse legal coercion into mental bealtb treatment. Altbougb mental bealtb treatment generally is intended to belp, legal coercion into treatment involves stripping a person of some rigbts and liberties, and tberefore, may be viewed as punisbment.
If controllability and responsibility attributions determine responses to people witb mental illness, it is important to understand wby people view mental illness as a controllable pbenomenon for wbicb tbe sufferer is responsible. We examined tbe possibility tbat a person's political ideology is influential. Tbat is, some people, because of tbeir personal ideological beliefe about bow tbe world works, may be more likely to attribute individual responsibility for a problem tban otbers. Several studies bave examined tbe impact of political ideology on attributions and intentions to belp and suggested tbat it may play a role in Weiner's attribution model (Skitka & Tetlock, 1992 Zucker & Weiner, 1993) . Tbese studies suggested tbat political conservatism is associated witb tbe tendency to attribute personal responsibility for problems.Tbus, we predicted tbat conservative individuals would be more likely to attribute mental illness to bad cbaracter and, tberefore, more likely to endorse legally coercive treatment.
Wbereas substantial support exists for attribution models of belping bebavior, growing evidence also suggests tbat perceptions of dangerousness are central to tbe public's response to individuals witb mental illness (Brockington, Hall, Levings, & Murpby, 1993; Coben & Struening, 1962; Link, Pbelan, Bresnaban, Stueve, & Pescosolido, 1999; Pescosolido et al., 1999; Taylor & Dear, 1981) and one of tbe criteria for mandating treatment. Indeed, tbese perceptions influence endorsement of legally mandated treatment Pescosobdo et al., 1999) . Tbus, we incorporated perceived dangerousness into our attribution model of support for legal coercion (see Figure 1 ) to determine tbe relative influence of attributions and dangerousness. We predicted tbat perceptions of dangerousness mediate tbe effect of causal attributions on support for legally mandated treatment.
METHOD Data
Tbe data for tbis study come from tbe 1996 General Social Survey (GSS), wbicb was fielded by tbe National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago.The GSS is a nationally representative probability sample of noninstitutionalized adults living in the contiguous United States. It is a survey of opinion, attitudes, and behaviors of the U.S. population. The longest running longitudinal survey of the population, it has existed since 1972. Currently, the survey operates with a biennial split sample design, which consists of two parallel subsamples of about 1,500 cases each. The subsamples receive an identical core survey and different topical modules. Earlier methodological work indicates that the subsample N of 1,500 is sufficient to provide a representative view of opinions held by Americans (Pescosolido, Martin, Link, Stueve, & Kikuzawa, 2000) , making it likely that the results of this study are generalizable. In 1996 the GSS included the topical MacArthur Mental Health Module, which addressed Americans' knowledge, attitudes, and beliefs about mental illness by using a vignette experiment. Although several published analyses of the MacArthur Mental Health Module have used these measures to examine public views of mental illness, dangerousness, competence, and legally coerced treatment Martin, Pescosolido, &Tucb, 2000; Pescosolido et al., 1999; Pescosolido et al., 2000; Phelan, Link, Stueve, & Pescosolido, 2000) , they did not examine the relative impact of attributions of cause and perceptions of dangerousness on support for legally mandated treatment. The module was administered to a randomly selected subsample of 1,444 respondents. Each respondent was presented with one of five vignettes, four of which depicted DSM-IV disorders and one that depicted subclinical problems (see Appendix for sample vignette wording). Included disorders were schizophrenia, major depression, alcohol dependence, and drug dependence. Sex, race, ethnicity, and education were varied at random in the vignettes. After being presented with the vignette, respondents were asked a series of questions pertaining to the vignette subject. A subset of those items was used for this study.
Sample
Slightly more than half of the respondents were male; 81% were white, 14% were black, and 5% were listed as other. Respondents' ages ranged from 18 to 89 (M = 44.7) years; and years of education ranged from 0 to 20 (M = 13.3). Of the 1,266 respondents that reported total family income, 156 had annual household incomes of $75,000 or more. The average household income for the remaining 1,110 was $32,068. Means,standard deviations,and bivariate correlations for tbe model variables are listed in Table 1 .
Measures
Political ideology was measured with one item in which respondents were asked bow they thought of themselves in terms of being liberal or conservative. This single-item scale is correlated witb more elaborate measures of political ideology and is adequate as a stand-alone measure (Farwell &Weiner, 2000; Skitka &Tetlock, 1993) . Responses were based on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = extremely liberal to 7 = extremely conservative. Respondents were asked whether, in their opinion, the cause of the vignette subject's probletns was bad character.T\ns item was used in this study as a proxy forWeiner's controllable cause attribution, based on the assumption that problems caused by bad character are considered within the individual's control. Responses were based on a four-point scale ranging from 1 = not at all likely to 4 = very likely. To determine perceived dangerousness, respondents were asked how likely the vignette subject was to hurt others. Responses were based on a four-point scale ranging from 1 = not at aU likely to 4 = very likely). It should be noted, that although affective reaction is an important construct in Weiner's attribution model, the data used in this study did not allow us to test this component of the model. Support for legal coercion was measured by five items that asked if the subject should be forced by law to get treatment at a clinic or from a doctor, take prescription medication to control his or her behavior, be admitted to a hospital for treatment, be admitted to a hospital if dangerous to himself or herself, or be adtnitted to a hospital if dangerous to others. AU itetns were answered "yes" or "no." Tbe number of "yes" answers were summed to make up the score (a =.7620). Possible scores ranged from 0 to 5.
Analysis Strategy
Analysis was conducted in three stages to test the theoretical model (see Figure 2) . Structural equation modeling was used because it examines both the size and direction of association among a set of variables (Hatcher, 1994) . It allows for the specification and testing of complex path models that examine mediational relationships and the causal processes underlying the target phenomena (Kelloway, 1998) , in this case, attitudes about mental illness and support for legally mandated treatment. We first tested a model (model 1) examining paths from political ideology to bad character, and bad character to support for mandated treatment. We then added dangerousness to tbe model (model 2) as an exogenous variable with a path to mandated treatment. Finally, we added a path from bad character to dangerousness (model 3) and examined dangerousness as a mediator of attributions of bad character (compare model 3 to model 1). All analyses were conducted using tbe SAS System's CALIS procedure. The maximum likelihood method of parameter estimation was used and analyses were performed on the variance-covariance matrix.
AU variables are manifest, with one item (or in the case of legal coercion, one scale score) per construct. Because most of the variables are single-item indicators, no measurement model was computed. AU path coefficients are standardized path coefficients. Measures of significance for individual parameters were calculated by SAS and reported as a (test. Given the large sample size, these values were interpreted using critical values for the z test.Values above 1.96 are significant at tbe p < .05 level and indicated in tbe figures and tables witb an asterisk (*).
RESULTS

Variables
Political Ideology. Tbe mean score was 4.23 {SD = 1.4), just slightly more conservative than moderate. Thirty-eight percent of tbe respondents tbought of tbemselves as moderates. Twenty-four percent saw themselves somewbere on tbe liberal side of moderate, and 37% saw themselves on the conservative side. Attribution of Bad Character. Overall, 17% of the respondents indicated it was very likely, 28% somewhat likely, 32% not very likely, and 22% not at all likely that the vignette subject's difficulties were due to bad character.
Dangerousness. Overall, 14% of respondents believed tbe vignette subject was not at all likely, 32% not very likely, 37% somewhat likely, and 17% very likely to do something violent toward other people.
Legal Coercion Scale. The number of "yes" answers to five items related to legal coercion to treatment were added together to make the legal coercion score.The mean score was 2.8 {SD = 1.47).
Path Analysis
A theoretical model provides a good fit to the data when it successfully accounts for relationships between a set of observed variables (Hatcher, 1994) . Five goodness-of-fit indices are reported here. Chi square is a test of the null hypothesis. Unlike traditional hypothesis testing, a nonsignificant cbi square implies that there is no significant discrepancy between the covariance matrix derived from the model and the observed covariance matrix. A nonsignificant chi square suggests that the model fits the data and can reproduce the observed covariance matrix.
The normed fit index (NFI) (Bentler & Bonett, 1980) ranges from 0 to 1. It indicates the percentage of improvement in goodness-of-fit over the baseline independence (null) model. The nonnormed fit index (NNFI) is similar in logic, but takes degrees of freedom into consideration. This index may result in numbers greater than 1. The comparative fit index (CFI) (Bentler, 1990 ) is based on the noncentral chi-square distribution. Values range between 0 and 1.Values on the NFI, NNFI, CFI of .90 or greater suggest an acceptable fit between the model and data. Tbe root mean square error of approximation (t^JVISEA) estimate (Steiger, 1990 ) is based on the analysis of residuals, with smaller values indicating a better fit with the data. Values below .05 are considered a very good fit.
Fit measures for model 1 (see Table 2 ) suggest adequate fit to the data, and the direct paths from political ideology to bad character and bad character to mandated treatment are significant. However, the model explains only 2% of the variance in support for legally mandated treatment. In model 2, dangerousness to others was added as an exogenous variable. The direct path from bad character to coercion remained significant but decreased in strength. The direct path from dangerousness to mandated treatment was significant with a standardized beta coefficient of .34. Although the variance explained increased to 12%, none of the fit measures approached adequacy. In model 3 (see Table 2 and Figure 2 ), we added a path from bad character to dangerousness. AU paths in the model were significant at the ;? < .05 level, and all fit measures indicated a good model fit with the data.This model explained 14% of the variance in support for legally mandated treatment.
Results from these path models suggest that the perception of dangerousness to others partially mediates the relationship between attributions of bad character and support for legally mandated treatment.When dangerousness was added to the model, the strength of the path from bad character to mandated treatment was reduced from .15 to .08.The path from bad character to danger was significant, with a standardized beta weight oi^ .21, indicating that bad character is partially mediated by perceptions of dangerousness. Additional analyses were completed that controlled demographics, familiarity with mental illness, perceptions of condition seriousness, and likelihood that the subject was experiencing a mental illness (Watson, 2001 ). Demographics and familiarity did not significantly change the relationships in the models. Clearly, perceived dangerousness was the strongest predictor of support for legally coercive treatment for the vignette subject, whereas, attribution of bad character had a weaker but still significant direct association with support for legal coercion and an indirect effect through dangerousness. Thus, people seem more willing to legally coerce people that they feel are dangerous and to blame for their problems.
Post hoc analysis was also performed to examine the efiect of mental illness condition (Watson, 2001) . Respondents were most likely to attribute drug dependence to bad character, followed by alcohol dependence, major depression, minor troubles, and schizophrenia. Respondents also perceived the subjects of the drug and alcohol dependence vignettes as most dangerous and were most likely to endorse legal coercion for the subjects of the drug dependence and schizophrenia vignettes. Although mental illness condition had significant direct and indirect effects on support for legally mandated treatment, including it in the model did not significantly alter any of the relationships reported above.
DISCUSSION
When considering whether individuals should be subjected to legally mandated treatment, respondents relied heavUy on their perceptions of dangerousness. This is not surprising given that much of the public is at least vaguely aware of the danger to self or others criteria for involuntary commitment . It also makes sense that people would behave in a self-protective manner. In addition, this study demonstrated that people were more likely to support legally coercive measures for individuals who were believed responsible for their problems. This effect is partially mediated by perceptions of dangerousness, perhaps being strongest when dangerousness is less of an immediate issue.
We could not determine fixsm the data used in this study whether respondents interpreted legal coercion primarily as helping an individual receive necessary treatment, as a method of social control aimed at correcting unacceptable behavior and protecting the pubUc, or some combination of the two. We also did not test the direct effect of public perceptions and judgments on policy decisions related to the use of legal mandates to treatment. However, recent attention to issues of mandated treatment among policymakers appears to be in part a response to public fear and the lobbying of groups such as NAMI and the Treatment Advocacy Center, who are working to change legislation to relax criteria to involuntarily commit people with mental illness to inpatient or outpatient treatment.
Four other limitations of this study should be noted. First, the cross-sectional nature of the data does not allow us to confirm the direction of the paths, only that significant relationships exist. Second, our model explained only 14% of the variance in support for legal coercion. Having manifest rather than latent variables, we could not run a measurement model; thus, it is difficult to be sure how much of this low amount of variance explained might be due to measurement error. Clearly, other factors must be identified and examined. Finally, although our model was based on Weiner's attribution-affect-action model, we were not able to test the affective component. Future studies should test the full model and examine affective reaction as a moderator of attributions on support for mandated treatment.
Despite its limitations, this study provides new insight into the motivation behind policies that define under what conditions individuals with mental illness can and should be legally mandated to participate in treatment.This understanding provides direction for education and advocacy programs that seek to affect policy decision makers. Policies related to legally mandated treatment should balance the goals of clinical outcomes, client autonomy, and public safety and be informed by accurate information and research evidence. These policies should not be knee-jerk reactions based on erroneous stereotypes such as the belief that mental illness is caused by bad character or exaggerated perceptions of dangerousness. Education campaigns should target these myths about mental illness. In clinical training programs students and professionals should be encouraged to address the extent to which such stereotypes about mental illness inadvertently influence their own decision-making process. Our findings also highlight the need for fiiture research into the decision-making process at the policy and individual clinical level.
The results of our analysis also may have implications for the distribution of resources to different types of mental health services. Research indicates that programs that serve people who are viewed as responsible for their problems are likely to be allocated fewer resources (Skitka &Tetlock, 1992 Zucker & Weiner, 1993) . This would suggest that legislators who view people with psychiatric disabilities as responsible for their illness would likely divert funds from mental health programs. However, attributions of responsibility may evoke anger and, as our research indicates, the desire to apply legally coercive measures in the interest of social control. Thus, legally coercive and socially segregated programs may be allocated substantially more resources than integrative and consumer-oriented community services . Both policymakers and members of the mental health community must question whether this is a wise direction in which to move. WiHH
